The highway boondoggle that broke Maryland's transportation budget

A whopping 136 million dollars per mile for the 18.8 mile InterCounty Connector. What's even worse is that this was apparently in a semi-rural area for the construction, not an urban area with its attendant expenses.

The 18.8-mile Intercounty Connector, which opened in full Tuesday, could be the last publicly funded highway built in Maryland for a generation, as the state’s tolling agency, which financed its $2.56 billion construction, reaches its debt limit, local transportation experts said.

Financing for the six-lane toll road linking Interstate 270 in Montgomery County with Interstate 95 in Prince George’s County leveraged the Maryland Transportation Authority’s statewide toll collections.

But the transportation authority’s debt capacity is tapped out from borrowing to build the ICC and $1 billion in express toll lanes on I-95 northeast of Baltimore, state budget analysts said. Mounting debt recently prompted the authority to raise tolls statewide as the authority also struggles to maintain its aging bridges, tunnels and roads.

“You’re probably looking at another 20 years before we see another major road like this be built,” said Lon Anderson, a spokesman for AAA Mid-Atlantic.

Supporters say the ICC provides a vital east-west link long missing from Maryland’s highway network, but some critics worry about the toll road’s long-term financial effects. They say the ICC’s hefty price — it’s the most expensive road Maryland has ever built — has hamstrung the state’s transportation finances for years.

“The state has mortgaged its transportation future in many ways to the ICC,” said Montgomery County Council member Phil Andrews (D-Gaithersburg-Rockville), a longtime critic of the highway. “The opportunity cost of building the ICC has been huge, because it’s foreclosed improving many other roads.”

Whether the highway proves worth the investment — and at what cost — will play out over the next 10 to 30 years in several key measures: how many vehicles the ICC absorbs from local roads, time saved by motorists who use it, job growth from companies that rely on it to attract workers, and the impact it has on local streams and air pollution.

“The road, from an economic standpoint, will pay for itself many times over,” said Maryland Comptroller Peter Franchot (D), who helped put together the ICC’s financing plan in 2005 when he represented Montgomery in the General Assembly.

More at the link.

OCTA considering no confidence vote on CAHSRA

Voice of OC:

The Orange County Transportation Authority is considering sending state high-speed rail officials a memo urging them to "pull the plug" on the proposed $98-billion Anaheim-to-San Francisco project.

The 17-member board will vote next month on the wording of a message it plans to deliver to the state's High-Speed Rail Authority, which has overall authority to contract for construction of the rail system if the state Legislature and federal officials approve financing.

OCTA plans and builds most Orange County highway and rail systems, using federal, state and local tax money. But it has no jurisdiction over the planned 520-mile high-speed rail project.

A vote of no-confidence would come in part from a Republican-dominated board and be directed at Gov. Jerry Brown and Democratic legislators and members of Congress who support the rail plan.

But it was a Republican, former Anaheim Mayor Curt Pringle, who spearheaded much of the local support for the project. Pringle also served on the OCTA board and chaired the High-Speed Rail Authority in 2009 and 2010.

With Pringle gone, no one on the OCTA board spoke up for the rail system during Monday's meeting.

And at least six of the OCTA board members said they opposed the way the project is being handled.

The high-speed rail project has been beset by management problems. Voters approved the system in 2008 on the condition that when it is finished, no tax money will be used to operate it.

A new business plan released earlier this month was hailed for its realistic approach. But that created other problems, because the plan estimated the cost would be $98.5 billion, more than double the previous $43-billion estimate. It also predicted that most private investment, which had been promoted as a way to offset tax money, wouldn't materialize until after the system is up and running.

The rail authority's new business plan is open for public comment through January, which prompted OCTA board member Peter Herzog, a Lake Forest City Council member, to suggest the board send its own comments. Some wanted to vote immediately to oppose the project.

"The emperor has no clothes," said Supervisor John Moorlach, one of the OCTA directors. "Sometimes with a deal, it's good to tell someone 'no.' "

But OCTA Chairwoman Pat Bates, also a member of the Board of Supervisors, said, "Today, I don't think, is the day we should say ‘pull the plug.' I think we should have a deliberative process and not just knee-jerk here."

The board asked two of its committees to review the business plan and next month recommend what to tell the High-Speed Rail Authority.

Even though a no-confidence vote would have no legal effect on the rail authority, OCTA board members said such a vote coming from the transportation agency in California's third largest county would carry impact.

"Orange County already is left out of most of it," said Fullerton City Councilman Don Bankhead. "The whole thing doesn't make sense anymore."

While I've been a supporter of high speed rail in California, and continue to support a high speed rail network for California, the demonstrated incompetence and corruption by the Authority's recent business plan has caused me to turn against the current implementation of it. I intend, actually, to write to OCTA in support of this no-confidence motion.

The value of crash energy management

FRA delay and refusal to reform on its current "safety" regulations is inexcusable.

Edit on July 7, 10:15am: This brief paper puts forth in lives the difference between current standards and CEM: With only a 30 mile per hour impact, 55 lives would have been lost in the demonstrated collision with FRA equipment, but none with a CEM consist.

Some bad news for San Jose-San Francisco CAHSR

A recent CAHSRA memo bodes poorly for the current planning up in the Bay Area:

Since June, Caltrain has made significant progress in determining what capacity could be realized on the Caltrain corridor. The HST service would require at least four trains per hour per direction to serve the estimated passenger demand to and from the Peninsula and San Francisco. The Phase 1 service plan used for the Project‐level SF to SJ EIR stated that eight high‐speed trains phpd would be required for a fully built out Phase 1 during peak periods. Consequently, Caltrain has focused its operations simulation efforts on studying scenarios with six Caltrain trains and four high‐speed trains phpd which will offer the required performance level expected of high‐speed rail and the passenger capacity expected during this initial phase. While the initial model results show promise that such an operation is possible, as discussed above there are compromises that will need to be made by the Authority in order for the blended approach to work. Specifically the Authority will need to accept:

• That the high speed trains will not operate at 125 mph as originally envisioned for the SF to SJ corridor and consequently not be able to make the 30 minute travel time goal between SF and SJ as stated in Proposition 1A. It is not yet clear whether high‐speed trains will need to operate at 79 mph or possibly may be able to reach speeds of up to 110 mph on the Caltrain corridor. Further investigation continues.

• That the high‐speed trains will operate on a railroad with “at‐grade” crossings. The original performance criteria for the statewide system required a “fully grade‐separated” system.

An estimate of the capital cost of providing the necessary infrastructure for a blended solution indicates that it remains substantial. Initial estimates based on the existing engineering work by the Authority puts the total at approximately $5.3 billion (2010 dollars) for the mid‐line overtake solution.

...

The Transbay Transit Center (TTC) in downtown San Francisco is the preferred destination for the statewide HST system in San Francisco. According to recent estimates from the Transbay Joint Powers Authority, the estimated cost of developing the tunnels from 7th and Common Street, to the Transbay Terminal at Fremont and Mission Street is approximately $2.6‐$3 billion in year of expenditure dollars. This estimate includes the tunnels, stations and platforms at the TTC that would be able to serve thehigh‐speed and Caltrain trains. The $2.6 billion cost of this project is not currently included in the $5.3 billion estimate for the blended service described above.

At a grand total of eight billion dollars for the construction of a segment that will not manage the speeds (indeed, quite possibly being slower than current Metrolink and Amtrak trains in Orange County along the LOSSAN line) necessary to meet Prop 1A requirements, it is highly unlikely that CEO van Ark will not choose to "value engineer" the routing as is being studied with the renewed look at the Grapevine routing. Indeed, choosing to go with the superior Altamont corridor as a cost savings measure (since it would require a much smaller amount of shared ROW between Caltrain and CAHSR and would reduce the cost of the Sacramento extension) seems like it would almost be a slam dunk as the Authority is not prejudiced in its routing options, either Pacheco or Altamont, under the terms of Proposition 1A while the Authority is likely going to need to convince the Legislature to amend the law to permit the Grapevine route to proceed, bypassing Palmdale.

It also introduces the potential that an IOS encompassing the entire San Joaquin Valley, from Sacramento on south (and potentially to Los Angeles) might not be as crazy an idea as it initially seemed. Phase II extensions, after all, are permitted if they will not interfere with Phase I construction or funding. If extending to San Jose or San Francisco is delayed due to routing studies or insufficient capital, Sacramento may be ideally placed to take advantage of that delay, using the on-hand capital for a quick expansion and ignoring much of the current NIMBY issues in the Bay Area.

Perhaps most importantly, however, is the Authority's apparent willingness to consider mixed traffic with at grade crossings. If it is willing to do so in the Bay Area, it may very well be willing to similarly do so in Southern California and adopt a "blended LOSSAN" system rather than the current Riverside-Inland Empire dogleg. Not only this save a tremendous amount of money, but while the total cost of a Los Angeles-San Diego LOSSAN upgrade retaining grade crossings is likely in the same eight billion dollar ballpark as San Jose-San Francisco, it has the advantage of serving a much greater populace with a far larger potential for automobile diversion and ridership than either the current dogleg or the Bay Area Caltrain upgrade.

Canadian Pacific rolling out an innovative new intermodal system

From RailwayAge:

Canadian Pacific on Monday said it will be the exclusive Canadian rail transportation provider for trailer supply company Contrans, using innovative multimodal flat rack containers from Calgary, Alberta-based Raildecks Intermodal.

CP has been testing Raildecks' 53-foot collapsible, multimodal carriers through this past summer at its Toronto Intermodal Facility in Vaughn, Ontario. The testing proved successful on CP's long-haul intermodal trains, offering an alternative to shippers who have been relying on trucks to move their products over a long distance, Raildecks said.

“Raildecks’ innovative product extends the efficiencies of intermodal rail to industrial products shippers,” said John McBoyle, vice-president Intermodal at Canadian Pacific. “We believe industrial product customers will be attracted to the consistency, efficiency and , reliability of our long-haul intermodal network.”

“The Raildecks solution provides a viable option to convert some of the industrial freight that is moving over the road to be transported on intermodal rail,” said Raildecks CEO Rick Jocson. “By converting a traditional over-the-road commodity to rail, Raildecks are reducing greenhouse gas emissions, freeing up major roads and highways, and reducing costs for shippers.”

“We are excited to be able to provide shippers with a brand new service offering,” stated Stan G. Dunford, Contrans' chairman and CEO. “This will revolutionize the long haul flatbed market and will result in substantial efficiencies and savings for shippers.”

The Raildecks solution should allow for increased use of rail by customers using flatbed trailers and cars at present. Additionally, routes currently constrained in train length due to sidings or other issues should see a capacity increase for those cargoes currently traveling on flat cars due to the doubling up that these cars provide.

Madrid-Barcelona operating profit margin is 20%

A rather handy graphic taken from a RENFE presentation to the CAHSRA this past June, page 50. This is simply further evidence that high speed rail pays for itself and doesn't require external operational subsidies.

San Diego is doing something right: Double digit gains in Coaster and Sprinter ridership

The American Public Transportation Association has put out a report on growth in the use of public transit in the first six months of 2011 compared to 2010 and San Diego comes out leading the rest of California in terms of percentage gain. In light rail, Sprinter posted an 11.55% year over year gain, while the San Diego Trolley came in second with a 7.4% increase. Similarly, commuter rail showed a 17.13% increase for the Coaster. Altamont Commuter Express came in second with a 9.37% increase, closely followed by the Capitol Corridor's 9.17%. Metrolink, by contrast, came in at an utterly anemic 1.7% increase in year over year ridership.

While these figures are certainly going to be a bit inflated by the low starting position that San Diego's lines began from, compared to the rest of Californian systems (in absolute terms, for instance, Caltrain had three times the increase of Coaster), they still represent a major increase. They also pose an interesting question that I do not have the answer for at present: Why is Coaster doing so well while Metrolink is not?